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ABSTRACT
Current dominant understandings of biological sex and gender that rely upon binary
constructions are problematic on cultural, political, and individual levels. Cultural
misunderstandings of the complexities of biological sex have harmful consequences,
including the unnecessary surgical and medical interventions on intersexed bodies and
the negative psychological effects of gender stereotypes. Anne Fausto-Sterling’s book,
Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (2000), advances
necessary progressive feminist perspectives on the subject. I employ critical discourse
analysis comparing original scientific and academic discourses with the author’s
translations. I argue that she questions binary sex development and assignment in ways
that challenge the problematic foundational arguments of Science. This study contributes
to current research on the rhetoric of science, positioning Sexing the Body as a model for
engaging a dual audience, and as a pedagogical tool for scholars who translate knowledge
from specialized disciplines in the Sciences for popular audiences.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
There are severe cultural, political, and personal consequences which are
attributed to current notions of biological sex and gender. First, most egregious and least
discussed as such, is the current western practice of genital mutilation on infants born
with varying degrees of ambiguous genitalia (Chase 1998a, 1998b). Approximately two
percent of children, around eighty-thousand, a year are subjected to invasive and often
dangerous surgeries that are medically unnecessary, performed solely in order to preserve
cultural consistency in dichotomous sex (Faust-Sterling, 2000). Further, the concept of
gender itself is predicated on an established binary sex – feminine and masculine
behaviors, etc. – and has well-researched sociopolitical implications. Issues for the
LGBTQIA community range from personal safety (Montano, 2017; Palm, 2018; Wilson,
2018) to political agency (Arana, 2018; Kentish, 2017; Shear & Savage, 2017). Further,
women continue to be underrepresented in STEM careers even though, more often than
not, they outperform them in the field while in college (Fine, 2010).
The last of these issues originates from the psychological impact of gender bias
on women and men. Cordelia Fine (2010) cited sociologist Shelley Correll as she argued,
“how easy it [was] to create a gender stereotype that diminishe[d] women’s confidence
and interest in a supposedly male domain” (p. 49). In other words, if you are told that you
don’t belong somewhere long enough, you start to believe it, and vice versa. Moreover,
within the field genetic science, as it advanced the “stock-breeding” metaphor of
eugenics, there came an association between genes and performance predictions (Condit,
1999). That is, male and female genetic makeup was operated as empirical evidence
explaining sex-discrepant phenomenon.
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The few major issues mentioned above represent only a brief glimpse of the many
consequences of our current notions of binary sex and accompanying beliefs about
gender. Moving forward, it is essential that we question what is taken as fact about our
differences, and champion more radical philosophies that exists both in Science and
academia. I argue that Anne Fausto-Sterling’s second book, Sexing the Body: Gender
Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (2000) (hereafter referred to as Sexing the
Body), exemplifies the revolutionary reimagining necessary to address these and other
issues that are the result of our misunderstanding of sex.
SEXING THE BODY AS A SIGNIFICANT ARTIFACT
Sexing the Body represents a culturally significant artifact for its unique genre, its
immediate and lasting impact on both scholarly and public discourse, and its radical
content concerning sex development and assignment. First, as a book-length scholarly
essay (Varghese & Abraham, 2004), Sexing the body exemplifies a hybrid genre which
fosters a combination of academic rigor/standards, accessibility to lay audiences, and
theoretical and philosophical considerations beyond those enabled in academic journals.
Adhering to the academic expectation of evidence-based claims, I explore and argue
these points in more detail in a later section.
Second, the author’s research regarding various aspects of sex development is
cited in journal articles, scholarly books, and conference papers concerned with, to name
a few examples, neuroscience (Fine, 2010, 2017), genetics (Kaplan & Rogers, 2003;
Happe, 2013) and even sports (Travers, 2008; Wiederkehr). The book received “positive,
even glowing, reviews…in the New England Journal of Medicine, in Choice: Current
Reviews for Academic Libraries, and elsewhere” (Schiff, 2001). In other words, the book
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was critical to engaging and furthering existing scholarship and academic debates on the
issues discussed in her book and was generally well-received in expert circles.
Furthermore, its impact on public discourse immediately after its release and well
into later years, is noteworthy. A New York Times journalist noted that she was already a
celebrated researcher, as Myths of Gender “[was] used in women’s studies courses
throughout the country” (Dreifus, 2001), which could be argued to have improved her
ethos with both academic and popular audiences, aiding the reception of the following
book. The published interview explored Fausto-Sterling’s radical counterpoints to notions
of traditional developmental biology and did so in a medium that is mentioned by the
Pew Research Center as one of the top three circulated magazines in the US (Barthel,
2018). Sexing the Body was also taken up in Ms. Magazine (Coventry, 2000), where the
writer used statistics from the book to discuss the number of genital anomalies occurring
each year – around 80,000 cases.
In Here Magazine, Joe Galbo (2000) wrote about a conversation he had while on
his way to an academic conference with a 64-year-old woman going in for sex-change
surgery. Sexing the Body was twice referenced in “A Brief Guide to Gender
Terminology” at the end of the article, once as a book to read in general, and again for its
statistics on intersexed occurrences. More recently, in 2015, Barbara J. King, wrote an
article for NPR titled, “What Does It Mean to Be Intersex?” In the report, she noted that
her anthropology and gender undergraduates “… start by discussing Sexing the
Body…which lays out the anatomical and genetic science of the situation and explains
how quick the medical profession has been to surgically ‘fix’ babies identified at birth as
intersex, by sculpting the body to make it functionally male or female” (King, 2015).
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This last example illustrates the simultaneous impact the book has had on pedagogy in
higher education and popular discourse. Lastly, the book remains available to a wide
audience as it is still in circulation, offered in print (hardcopy and paperback), e-book,
and audiobook online and in book stores across the country.
Finally, Sexing the Body represents a significant artifact for analysis owing to its
radical content. Fausto-Sterling, unlike most gender theorists, does not presuppose a
binary biological sex. As I review in the following section, most past and current research
on sex and gender operates from a position where biological sex is a taken-for-granted
fact, subsequently situating gender as the primary concern. Researchers in women’s
studies, gender studies, and similar fields, have focused on aspects like the personal,
political, and cultural repercussions of gender norms, where biological sex is not in
question. For example, Cordelia Fine (2010, 2017) wrote extensively on the application
of neuroscience in uncovering and understanding differences between the sexes based on
cognitive orientations.
Although she states that “[t]he sheer stability and staying power of the idea that
male and female psychologies are inherently different can’t help but impress” (xx), her
ultimate critique is of the methods used to substantiate those claims, not the claims
themselves. She concludes that social and cognitive factors are interconnected in the
determination of gendered behavior, and that “when researchers look for sex differences
in the brain or the mind, they are hunting a moving target. Both are in continuous
interaction with the social context” (236). In other words, sex – “the basic,
determining…factor…for the reproductive system” (Fine, 2017, p.92) - is not the basic
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determining factor to establish male and female brains; however, this framework still
privileges genitals/sex organs as the main indicators of sex difference.
Additionally, the work of Alice Dreger (2015) fiercely argues against the medical
intervention of socially unaccepted, yet medically functional, genitals. However, a key
difference between her work and Fausto-Sterling’s is the radical next step of viewing
“sex” as a deficient category of understanding by deprivileging genitals as the marker of
identification. In other words, the argument presumes that sex organs/genitals define
biological sex, thus constructing the concept of distinct behaviors (read gender), and
studies should then focus on how and why those differences exist. The challenge to that
notion is a particularly radical one, which Fausto-Sterling notably takes up in Sexing the
Body.
In my study, I argue that Fausto-Sterling maintains the integrity of the arguments
that she translates from scientific/academic discourses regarding biological sex
development and assignment, and in doing so provides a model for critical scholars in
communication and rhetoric for attending to the moral problem of scientific
accommodations for popular audiences. Further, in light of the issues addressed in the
introduction, I contend that it is of vital importance for non-expert audiences to be
provided with reliable and accessible translations of Scientific information on the subject
and that the perspectives advanced must question taken-for-granted notions of binary sex
development and assignment in ways that challenge the inaccurate and harmful
foundational arguments of associated dominant ideologies.
Lastly, I maintain that Fausto-Sterling’s work highlights the utility of this hybrid
genre – the book-length scholarly essay - for critical scholars in the field of
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communication and rhetoric. Given the unique space provided by the book-length
scholarly essay, alternative theorizations existing outside the accepted practices of
research articles can be explored in new and important ways. These intellectual
speculations are important for reimaging potentialities towards novel conceptions of sex
and its relationship to the body and identity.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study is guided by three research questions. First, how does Fausto-Sterling
translate technical arguments questioning biological sex for a popular audience? Second,
how do these translations vary from their technical origins? Finally, what rhetorical
and/or ideological work is accomplished by these translations?
PREVIEW
In the following chapter, I situate Fausto-Sterling’s work within scholarly
considerations of Science Studies, including from the perspectives of cultural studies,
women’s studies, and communication and rhetoric. First, I highlight the foundational
critiques of Science, moving through the research on the rhetoric of science. Next, I
discuss feminist interrogations of scientific discourse and practice, and its application of
such critique to the science of sex. Then, I consider research on the rhetoric of genetic
science and the translation of all these technically focused arguments between audiences.
Finally, in the last section, I explain the ways that book-length scholarly essays achieve a
middle-ground between technical and popular-audience writing—between forensic and
epideictic rhetoric. Specifically, I position Sexing the Body as a model for this genre
using Fausto-Sterling’s critiques of scientific rhetoric and practice; gender and Science;
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and the ideologies of genetic science as examples in line with features of book-length
scholarly essays.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
SEEING SCIENCE AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
Sexing the Body expresses numerous aspects of scholarly research into the sciences,
namely research on the rhetoric of science, feminist critiques of science, and the more
recent rhetoric of genetic science. It is the decades of this groundwork which allowed
Fausto-Sterling to be in a position to write content like that found in this book. Critically,
the promoted authority of Science was questioned by philosophers of science. Thomas
Kuhn (2012) opened the door to critiquing the notion of science as fully objective praxis,
being without social influence and lacking the fingerprints of its practitioners. He argued
that there was a social context to knowledge production in the sciences. He demonstrated
this, stating, “…new paradigms are born of old ones…[b]ut they seldom employ [the]
borrowed elements in quite the traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms,
concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other” (149). That is,
as Science shifts from one paradigm to the next, there is an interpretive and relational
element that defies its supposed objective nature.
Building on this knowledge, Fay and Moon (1977) questioned the paradigmatic
positioning of physics in scientific inquiry, which was used to justify the belief in its
objectivity. They came to the conclusion that the fundamentally different theoretical
requirements of science versus social science proved that physics could not be, and was
not, the paradigm of scientific inquiry. This critique, and similar others, helped spur the
argument that Science was a fully social process. Further examinations of the history of

7

science provided insight into its culturally-bound processes and further critiques gained
momentum, calling into question its methodologies (McAllister, 2014), and highlighting
gendered discourses which permeated its various institutions (Keller, 1989).
Researchers in communication studies took on research on the rhetoric of Science
along two partly parallel trajectories. One, the more formal approach to Rhetoric, which
examined the rhetorical strategies of scientific writing upon which its success or failure
as persuasive communication hinged. Two, a feminist perspective which examined
Science’s discourses and practices, illuminating the impact they had on the social world.
In research on the rhetoric of science aimed at studying its persuasive communication,
early works illustrated that Science was a rhetorical activity. Researchers examined its
modes of inquiry, reasoning, specialists’ ethos, organization of publications, and types of
discourses and argumentation (see Bazerman, 1996; Campbell, 1990; Gross, 1996;
Fhanestock, 1999; Miller, 1984; Prelli, 1989).
Recent studies outweigh the space available here, but scholars have taken up analyses
of orders of discourse and audiences in socioscientific controversies (e.g. Stewart, 2009),
scientific controversy in public debate (e.g. Ceccarelli, 2011), the relationship between
science, rhetoric, and politics in a “world risk society” (e.g. Danisch, 2010), and, in line
with the new materialist rhetoric of science, disability justice and genetic engineering
(e.g. Benjamin, 2016). As technology forces a more interdisciplinary approach to rhetoric
of science (e.g. Graham, 2015), the scholarship aimed towards new materialist rhetoric of
science continues to grow.
Early feminist critiques of Science adopted a social justice lens through which to
analyze how Science was used in service of oppressive agendas (Harding, 1986),
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specifically taking issue with its gendered discourses and practices. Sexist language
bolstered the ideologies of Science (Norman, O., 1998; Rutherford, A., Vaughn-Blount,
K., & Ball, L. C., 2010; McGee, E. O., & Bentley, L., 2017), and feminist scholars
brought to light the many ways in which it affected women as a group (e.g. Haraway, D.,
1985, 1989; Harding, S., 1986; Smith, D., 1981). They demonstrated how these
ideologies reinforced systemic oppressions which devalued women’s knowledge on a
whole (Hartsock, 1983). The feminist works produced over the years verified the
“massive historical resistance to women’s getting the education, credentials, and jobs
available to similarly talented men” (Harding, 1986, p.21).
In addition to this, they investigated the psychological and social devices which
informally maintained these discriminatory measures against women, despite the formal
barriers being removed. For example, anti-discrimination laws may have been put into
place, but individual instances of biased hiring practices and restricted vertical mobility
in the work place (Reskin, 1978) continued despite its illegality. Some of the recent
feminist research on the rhetoric of science has investigated these systemic issues in
biology/psychoanalysis (e.g. Birke, L., 2000), anthropology and bioethics (e.g. Karkazis,
K., 2008), cognitive sociology (e.g. Freidman, A., 2013), neuroscience (e.g. Fine, C.,
2010, 2017), and intersex clinical reforms (e.g. Dreger, A., 2015), to name a few.
Feminists also paved the way for the questioning of sex development and associated
gendered behaviors. At the heart of this issue was the foundational work of sexologists
John Money and Anke Ehrhardt (1972) who posited that gender was the embodiment of a
psychological process where internal convictions of the self were expressed, and sex was
solely made up of physical attributes – both anatomically and psychologically determined
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(Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Their research opened the door to the notion that sex was a
biological fact and it was the root cause of all behavioral differences between males and
females (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Two researchers at the time stood out in opposition of
Money and Ehrhardt’s claims, social psychologist Suzanne J. Kessler and Wendy
McKenna (1978).
They pioneered the application of ethnomethodology to gender and sex, taking into
consideration intersexed individuals and the way their existence confounded previously
held beliefs that sex was dichotomous. Kessler and McKenna’s notions of “gender
attribution” preceded both Zimmerman and West’s (1987) “doing gender” and Butler’s
(1990) “gender performativity.” This critical scholarship paved the way for further
studies critiquing taken-for-granted notions of biological sex and gender, much of which
was predicated on the personal stories and medical histories of intersexed and transgender
individuals (see Burke, 1996; Dreger, 1998; Feinberg, 1996; Hausman, 1992, 1995;
Rothblatt, 1995) – with the exception of Haraway (1989) who drew from the scientific
work on primates to critique beliefs on sexed behaviors.
Furthermore, the rhetoric of genetic science combined elements of feminist and
traditional research on rhetoric of science. Approaches vary from quantitative accounts
and critical interpretations of the meaning of genetic science in public discourse (e.g.
Condit, 1999) to challenging the revolutionary positioning of genetic science in popular
discourse as the key to understanding all human behavior (e.g. Kaplan & Rogers, 2003)
to considerations of “biomedical discourse as political” (Happe, 2013, p.xiv). The
majority of these texts mentioned here do not appear in academic publications, and
consequently embody elements more closely related to the genre of “popularization.”
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Rhetoricians of science (see Dowdey, 1987; Dubois, 1986; Fahnestock, 1986, 2004;
Hornig, 1990; Lievrouw, 1990; Rowan, 1989) provided guidelines for understanding the
various shifts that take place in technical discourse when translated for non-expert
audiences. In the following section I discuss key differences between popularizations,
scientific papers, and book-length scholarly essays, highlighting the distinguishing
features and illustrating how they contribute not only to the importance of the new genre
but to establishing Sexing the Body as an important artifact for analysis.
POPULARIZATIONS VS. RESEARCH ARTICLES
In Jeanne Fahnestock’s (1986) formative work, “Accommodating science: The
rhetorical life of scientific facts,” the process of writing about science is differentiated
from writing in science, an activity termed “science accommodation.” She noted that
there “was a wonderful proliferation of book-length translations of science” where
scientists, like Carl Sagan and others, had “discovered a public voice” (p.277), but that
there lacked any study of them from a rhetorician’s perspective. Through her research,
Fahnestock (1986) identified a few key elements that identify them as a genre unto their
own. First, drawing from the results of her study of Nature and Science – Science82,
Science83, Science84 and Science85 – magazine, she noted that popularizations differ
from scientific papers in that they are epideictic in purpose, meant “to celebrate rather
than validate” (p.279).
By contrast, scientific papers are more closely related to forensic types of speech
in that they are devoted to validation, to “arguing for the occurrence of a past fact…”
(Fahnestock, 1986, p.278). This can be understood as having a relationship to
“readership.” The epideictic purpose of popularizations led their writers to use appeals to
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the audience’s values, advancing the ‘the wonder’ and ‘the application’ (Fahnestock,
1986, p.279), in order to assure significance – something that is assumed by the audience
of scientific papers. Additionally, as popularizations are intended for an overwhelmingly
different audience than their counterpart, the information is changed in its representation
while appealing “to readers who are not apiologists [sic] or even specialists in any life
science” (Fahnestock, 1986, p.280). This happens for two reasons. First, a non-expert
audience is understood to not speak in the highly-technical vernacular of scientific
papers, so writers adapt using lay terminology.
Second, appealing to the audience’s need/desire for simplified arguments
(Fahnestock, 1986), more assured positions are advanced. For example, some changes
may include the use of “intensifying phrases…claims of rarity and exaggerations… [or]
assertion[s] that it is ‘the first’ of its kind…[to] argue for its significance and value”
(Fahnestock, 1986, p.282). That is, the often heavily qualified and hedged results of
scientific papers are represented with greater certainty when adapted for less
knowledgeable audiences. Third, borrowing from the taxonomy of statement types
developed by sociologists Bruno Latour and Stephen Woolgar (1979), Fahnestock (1986)
noted that popularizations tended to operate in the level four to five range, meaning the
most certain and uncontroversial positioning of information. In contrast, scientific papers
stay within level one and two, which is the most heavily qualified and openly speculative.
BOOK-LENGTH SCHOLARLY ESSAYS
In genre, Fausto-Sterling’s, Sexing the Body, is neither academic journal article
nor scientific accommodation. It is a hybrid of both – a “book-length scholarly essay”
(heretofore referred to as BLSEs) (Varghese & Abraham, 2004). In a study conducted in
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2004, Varghese and Abraham argued three key features that define BLSEs in contrast to
scientific papers or popularizations: the author’s rhetorical purpose, audience, and
strategy. First, the author’s rhetorical purpose is defined as a commitment “to two kinds
of inquiry – the first philosophical and a second that is theoretical…writ[ing] to engage in
public discourse that links their research explicitly with broader human concerns”
(p.231). Fausto-Sterling does this as she joins her work on intersexed bodies to the
greater concerns for patient welfare and safety.
For example, she holds issues about the medical management of individuals with
androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) in conversation with the severe health risks
associated with common treatments paths. She states that there are “dangers of
developing osteoporosis” (65) associated with artificially induced feminization – a
repercussion of early removal of testis of XX intersex children. Additionally, she expands
her theory on the numerous variations of sex development to imagine how it might
impact the current sociopolitical climate surrounding gender. She offers an ethical
perspective along with each of her examinations, most explicit when considering the
numerous negative repercussions of current medical interventions of intersexed
individuals.
Next, the intended audience of BLSEs is unique as it engages a dual audience –
both popular and specialized audiences. Varghese et al (2004) stated that authors of
BLSEs “explicitly build a dialogue with their readers…addressing a lay audience…[but]
also speak at length about intending their work to be worthy of consideration by a jury of
their peers (p.208-209). Fausto-Sterling (2000) explicitly opens her book by noting how
its construction is intended to foster this balance. She stated, “…I have written two books
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in one: a narrative accessible to a general audience and a scholarly work intended to
advance discussion and arguments within academic circles” (p.iv). She acknowledged
that because academics demand detailed evidence, which can pull attention away from
the general argument, she created the second book in the notes section so as to not
distract from the main narrative. This includes “detailed evidence in the form of quotes
from original sources or detailed accounts of a particular experiment” (p.iv). However,
she goes on to encourage everyone to read the notes, including the general readers, owing
to its depth and diversity it adds to the text.
Lastly, the author’s strategy, or “generic structure,” is one which accomplishes
three aims lending credibility to BLSEs in the scientific enterprise. First, the rhetorical
moves “explicitly mark the…intention of…academics to pursue a synthesis and
reformulation of knowledge that crosses disciplinary boundaries – a disciplinary
synthesis that clearly could not be achieved through a dilution of the subject as found in
popularizations (Varghese et al, 2004, p.218). Second, the chapter bodies are not
narrative, “but argument, built step-by-step, as each hypothesis considered for belief is
rigorously and systematically tested, based on empirical evidence” (Varghese et al, 2004,
p.219).
Third, they strike a cautionary note, making sure to not overemphasis the certainty
of claims advanced. Fausto-Sterling achieves these three measures of the last feature, as
she builds properly qualified, yet empirically-backed arguments, crossing over disciplines
within the natural sciences. For example, in chapter 7, she builds a case (argument-style)
against the concept of “sex hormones” in favor of “growth hormones,” engaging the
eleven different branches of sex hormone research (cross-discipline synthesis), providing
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detailed accounts of their issue-laden results, culminating in a discussion about the
tenuous relationship between sex and gender and the reservations she holds that
knowledge correlates to change (qualified) (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p.170-194).
The influence that scientific information has on public opinion, as expressed by
Stewart (2009) and Fahnestock (2004), illustrates the need to employ the best model – the
BLSE – toward a solution to the moral problem of its translation. Each of these
respective endeavors contributed to the work of Fausto-Sterling in Sexing the Body, being
equal parts rhetorical and feminist analysis of scientific discourse in a hybrid genre. As
she draws from each field of study, her argument takes on the persuasive tactics of
socially-constructed scientific knowledges, viewing the results through a critical lens to
highlight the gendered nature of sex assignment.
As an end to this review, it behooves me to mention the BLSE’s utility
specifically for feminist aims. Fahnestock (1986) noted that the translation of scientific
information was a moral problem, especially when considering its application to the
research on gender, and the consequences of its misunderstanding can be serious and
lasting. The gendered history of Science and the issues with its popular adaptations have
provided evidence that we need a model for reliable, and widely disseminated,
progressive perspectives on gender and sex. Fausto-Sterling, specifically in Sexing the
Body, used the BLSE model as a tool for addressing a duel audience - speaking to the
public as a scientist and to scientists as a feminist - bringing the issues associated with
sex development and assignment to the public and advancing a radical feminist
perspective in expert circles.
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This points to the significance of Sexing the Body as an artifact. In the forthcoming
analysis and discussion, I demonstrate how it avoids the prime drawbacks found in
popularizations, retaining the integrity of the arguments between sources and
exemplifying the rigorous standards expected of and by experts; how it contributes
valuable insights by proposing and exploring new theories on sex and gender; and
illustrates the utility of the BLSE for advancing philosophies in connection with broader
cultural concerns. The arguments made about sex development and assignment in Sexing
the Body offer radical revisions to biological determinism and essentialism, which has the
potential to influence public and scholarly discourse (which I have argued to the
affirmative).
CHAPTER 3: METHOD
METHOD OF INQUIRY
Critical Discourse Analysis
In this section, I demonstrate how critical discourse analysis (CDA) can be used
to highlight rhetorical and discursive features of translations of scientific information
found in BLSEs. Fairclough’s (1992) approach to critical discourse analysis “offers
rhetoricians another critical social science perspective … that attends specifically to
language use at different levels and to its strategic and ideological functions” (Stewart,
2009). The first text layer pertains to “vocabulary, grammar, cohesion, and text structure”
(p. 75). The layer of discursive practice “involves processes of text production,
distribution, and consumption, and the nature of these processes varies between different
types of discourse according to social factors” (p. 78). Lastly, the social practice layer is
concerned with ideology – “significations/constructions of reality” (p.87) – and

16

hegemony – leadership and “domination across the economic, political, cultural and
ideological domains of a society…” (p. 92) – “as a way of theorizing change in relation
to the evolution of power relations…” (p. 92) Specifically, it focuses on power relations
as a way of “seeing [discourse] as contributing to and being shaped by wider process of
change” (p. 92).
The first and third layer are of particular importance to this study as they relate to
my research questions. They provide a means through which to analyze and understand
the (re)structuring and (re)articulation of scientific discourse in texts outside of their
respective publications. Greg Myers (2003) stated that “the popularization of science is
an unusual field for discourse analysis, because the scope of the field is defined in terms
of what it is not…include[ing] only texts about science that are not addressed to other
specialist scientists…” (265). That is, when studying certain modes of discourse – like
law, education, religion, etc. – we expect researchers to analyze the texts of those
disciplines. However, in the case of popularizations, by genre, researchers address not the
scientific discourses, but only their translations intended for lay audiences. As a hybrid
genre, BLSEs provide an opportunity to apply CDA of popularizations a step further,
incorporating discourse intended for expert and lay audience, where measures are taken
to engage each group.
The Toulmin Model
In my study, I operate CDA in a comparative argument inquiry between original
scientific/scholarly texts and their translation into the genre of BLSE. Specifically, I
analyze Sexing the Body as an artifact, identifying the arguments that approached the
genetics-based theories for sex development and assignment. As I apply CDA to Sexing
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the Body, I look to the Toulmin (1958) model to organize the arguments in a way that
allowed for a side-by-side comparison and critique. Toulmin described arguments as
“organisms” with anatomical and psychological structures, the former containing
“organs” (p.87). The macro level, the gross anatomical structure, is often lengthier where
main phases can be distinguished.
The micro, psychological level is finer, composed of individual sentences, and
here we find the logical connections introduced and validity established (p.87). Within
the micro, psychological phase, there are two triads that constitute the basic elements of
argument: first, the author’s explicit appeal, final proposition, or conclusion (claim), the
data, and the “logic” that connects these two elements (warrant) – warrants are often
implicit rather than explicitly stated; and, the certifying credentials of the warrant
(backing), any conditional element of the claim (rebuttal), and the level of certainty
expressed about the quality of the argument (qualifier) (Brockriede and Ehninger, 2009).
This analytic approach is key for my study in that it allows me to structure
rhetorical arguments for analysis and criticism, tracing the integrity of the arguments
from their technical sources to Fausto-Sterling’s translation. Here, integrity is used to
define the preservation of the argument at its core, where overall claims are consistent
between their two iterations. First, this method structures a model of argument that is
dynamic, “emphasizing the movement from data, through warrant, to claim,” terminology
which constructs a view of arguments as “‘working’ to establish and certify
claims…understand[ing] the role each part of an argument plays in this process”
(Brockriede et al, 2009, p. 47) (emphasis in original). Second, a “working” theory of
argument enables the identification of its parts that have remained intact and those that
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have been altered in translation – like a shift in warrant, a different claim, or differing
data used as proof. An argument that retained its reliability in translation would function
like a parallel case in which the claim would affirm what was already accepted in the
original argument.
The Toulmin Model proves useful adapted as an analytical tool to the framework
of CDA. It allows us to move “from phrase by phrase arguments towards texts in
context...” (Molina, 2013, p. 212), exposing “how various ideologies are expressed in the
structure of arguments” (Khoirunisa & Indah, 2017, p. 155). In other words, through the
systematic ordering of discourse, argument strategies can be identified and used to
illustrate the author’s implicit values and beliefs. When applied to the translation of
scientific/academic discourses, the Toulmin Model and CDA operate cooperatively to
assist the analysis of translation schemes and for discerning the motivations expressed
through those decisions.
IDENTIFYING ARGUMENTS FOR ANALYSIS
The following section explicates my method and rationale for selecting particular
arguments from Sexing the Body. Stemming from my assertion of the book’s significance
for its radical position on sex, I located and selected only arguments which pertained to
genetics/genomics, biological sex, and gender. To do so, I had four steps. First, I started
with the Table of Contents, where I looked for titles that sounded related to my research
agenda. Next, I went through each chapter’s subsection headings, looking for similar
thematic elements. Third, I then went through the index, first looking for my identified
keywords (genes/XX/XY/AIS/chromosomes/genetics/biological sex/gender), then
authors’ names of whom I knew to be researchers within the field of sex and genetics.
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Fourth, and finally, I scanned the index in its entirety to discover any alternative
terminology that related to my interest. Once I had established every instance I could find
where the author briefly mentioned, or discussed in-depth, any of my keywords, I
identified the citation that correlated with it. This supplied me with either a notation
expanding on the conversation or provided me a cited author. At a certain point, I
realized that it was going to be necessary to treat the notes section as an accompanying
text. I scanned the entirety of it, looking for authors, keywords, and discussion points that
related to my research interests. This process gave me the sets of arguments needed to
proceed to the analysis. In the following section, I investigate Fausto-Sterling’s strategies
in relation to those outlined in CDA, applying the BLSE scheme to her rhetorical
movements, and confer the results in conversation with my research questions. I follow
this with a discussion of the limitations of my study and a proposition for future research.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS
Fausto-Sterling took up the work of previous scholars who questioned various
aspects of sex development and assignment, both in academic and scientific fields. Her
book, Sexing the Body (2000) is a thorough dissection of the vast and varied histories of
sex determination, and it functions as two separate texts. The first half of the book is
intended for a general audience, while the second half is a means “to advance discussion
and arguments within academic circles” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p.vi). I focused on the
first section of the book, that which she stated was intended for a general audience, to
find what arguments were being made and which authors were cited whenever discussing
genetic-based explanations for sex development and assignment. Guided by my three
research questions, I identify how Fausto-Sterling translated technical arguments for a
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popular audience, how they vary from (or are similar to) their technical origins, and what
ideological work is evident in the translation. Based on the proposed significance of this
text as a radical feminist/scientific piece of literature, I also consider the radical position
being advanced by the questioning of sex as a privileged, or viable, category of
identification as it differs from the scholars whom she cites.
The forthcoming analysis is sectioned into two related categories in which
arguments for genetics-based sex development and assignment were made: arguments
concerning phenotype (the physical expression of genes on the body), and arguments
regarding social meaning (cultural interpretation of phenotype). For discussions about
phenotype, Fausto-Sterling cited Dreger (1998), and Kessler (1990, 1998). When
discussing social meaning she cited Kessler and McKenna (1978), Kessler (1990, 1998),
and Judith Butler (1993). Numerous arguments were made that dealt with sex
development and assignment being correlated with the physical expression of
chromosomes on the body (phenotype) – whether that be the development of certain or
varied internal sex organs and/or external genitalia – but only two of those arguments
occurred in the first half of the book. I did not include “further reviews” or added
arguments that occurred in the notes as they were intended for academic/scientific circles,
which puts them beyond the scope of my study.
The two arguments related to phenotype occurred in two contexts: a discussion of
classification/codification for hermaphrodites; and, the medical management of
intersexed infants. Five arguments were made which dealt with the social meanings
attached to phenotypes of (inter)sexed individuals. There may have been more discussion
about social meaning in the front half of the book owing that sex assignment by social
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“interpretation” is the overall argument of her book (hence the name “construction of
sexuality”). The five arguments regarding social meaning occurred in these specific
contexts: the medical management of intersexed infants; the varying physical traits
prioritized in sex/gender assignment; intersex surgical patients’ psychological health;
genital and gender variability; and, the constitutive force of “social construction” for
biological sex and gender.
PHENOTYPE
This argument came about in the second chapter, “The Sexe Which Prevaileth”,
under the sub-header “The Making of a Modern Intersexual” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000,
p.36). Fausto-Sterling discussed the steady elimination of the concept of “true
hermaphrodite” (TH) in the late 19th century through ideas published by the German
physician Theordor Albrecht Klebs. She cited the research of Alice Dreger (1998), as she
wrote about the evolution of TH classification in France and Britain. Dreger endeavored
to understand “how medical and scientific men thought about hermaphroditism…to get a
sense of how scientific theory influenced medical practice, and practice theory,” because
when you “[f]igure out how someone organizes the world…you…understand how he
sees the world” (p.141). Dreger believed that the organizational practices which
illustrated an individual’s worldview were also the mechanism of reinforcement – what
gained importance and what faded away. Breasts being made the primary trait marker of
mammals was used as parallel to explain the medical and scientific decision for gonadal
anatomy as trait marker of hermaphroditism.
She recounted the two phases that predated the age of gonads, that of France’s
Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Britain’s Sir James Young Simpson. Geoffroy created
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an analytic system of six “sex segments” – the profound portion, the middle portion, and
the external portion – where all segments were taken together in comparison to determine
femalehood or malehood, and of which would result in two classes of hermaphroditism.
In Simpson’s article, “Hermaphroditism, or Hermaphrodism” published in Cyclopaedia
of Anatomy and Physiology, the classification system “simply… group[ed] types of
hermaphroditism into readily comprehended categories,” (Dreger 1998, p.143) dividing
them into two orders, spurious and true. In other words, measures for “true”
hermaphroditism were fairly broad, and multiple combination types were included in the
categories.
She documented the transition from Simpson’s inclusive system to that of Klebs,
which significantly altered and complicated the criteria for TH classification. This
transition, she stated, was the catalyst for the phasing out of TH’s from medical journals;
not because they stopped being born, but because scientific methods were classifying
them out of existence (CLAIM). She used Kleb’s own work (DATA), to illustrate how
the classification system strictly narrowed to the “explicit use of the gonads as the sole
markers of true sex” (p.146). Klebs’s system, for example, would classify an entirely
internally feminine being as male for having testicles, and likewise, would classify a
masculine being as female for having ovaries. For example, one individual – Maria
Arsano – previously identified as TH, was reclassified under Klebs’s system as
“masculine pseudohermaphrodite” (emphasis in original) (p.145). In sum, Dreger posited
where many beings would previously qualify as TH, the subdivisions under true and false
hermaphroditism had become so complex that “significantly fewer people counted as
‘truly’ both male and female…the trend toward elimination of TH in humans” (p.146).
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Fausto-Sterling (2000) took up this argument in “The Making of the Modern
Intersexual,” also tracking the progression from Saint-Hilaire and Simpson’s systems to
Klebs’s; however, she has a different take on the previous researchers’ systems. In the
context of the argument, Fausto-Sterling is not as forgiving of Geoffroy’s and Simpson’s
practice classifying sex and declaring bodies as abnormal, in need of correction. She
declared their endeavors as aiding “[t]he hermaphrodite vanishing act” (p.37). She
affirmed that the emerging science of biology, that which gained authority over
ambiguous bodies and reorganized science’s notions of sexual difference, was
responsible for future negative social implications, the management of those bodies as
unhealthy and in need of treatment. She even went so far as to compare Simpson’s
system to Klebs’s. She says, “Like Simpson, Klebs contrasted ‘true’ with what he called
‘pseudo’ – hermaphrodites” (p.38). This dichotomy of either/or is something FaustoSterling critiqued, where Dreger took issue with the transition to the gonad-focused
system. In sum, Dreger’s conclusion was that Klebs’s system was phasing out TH’s, and
she used the increased criteria as data, linking the two through the position that the focus
on gonads was far too limiting as a baseline. Fausto-Sterling concluded that TH’s were
being phased out, using the system specifics as data, but linked the two with the position
that the new science of sex classification, advanced by Geoffroy, Simpson, and Klebs,
was equally implicated in preordaining the negative consequence.
While contesting intersexed healthcare professionals’ commitment to the
bioethical principle “first, do no harm,” Fausto-Sterling breathed life into the debate
using personal testimony of individuals who experienced having multiple “corrective”
surgeries. In chapter four, “Should There Be Only Two Sexes?” under the subheading
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“Right to Refuse,”, she avowed, “Dogma has it that without medical care, especially
early surgical intervention, [the intersexed] are doomed to a life of misery. Yet there are
few empirical investigations to back up this claim. In fact, the studies gathered to build a
case for medical treatment often do just the opposite” (p.93). She noted here that
Kessler’s 1990 study, “The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of
Intersexed Infants” published in Signs, is cited.
In this article, Kessler chronicled the management of intersex infant cases as
proposed by John Money, J. G. Hampson, and J. L. Hampson in 1955 and further
developed by John Money and Anke A. Ehrhardt in 1972. Since the entire article is cited,
I reviewed each segment to find potentially related quotes which fit best with the
conversation in which it was cited. In the section, “The theory of intersexuality
management,” Kessler responded to some of the conditions noted by Money et al which
were claimed to be a result of the non-surgical-treatment of intersex infants. Kessler
stated, “…although there are life-threatening aspects to some of these conditions, having
ambiguous genitals per se is not harmful to the infant’s health” (p.5) (CLAIM). Kessler
backed her position (DATA) stating that the evidence for such an assertion was not only
limited in quantity, but also all coming from the same researcher, John Money. The
warrant is implied, where, in science, volume and variety are both chiefly important to be
able to qualify any research as having scientific merit.
Fausto-Sterling’s claim concerned evidence in two ways – the lack of empirical
evidence to support dogma, and the evidence which contradicts the claim – and Kessler’s
claim was an assertion about the evidence, that not all conditions which result in
ambiguous genitalia are life-threatening. In other works, both authors claimed something
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about evidence, the former regarded the evidence as limited and contradictory, while the
latter considered it limited and inaccurate. Fausto-Sterling cited Kessler’s work as her
data, as well as three accounts which contradicted the evidence for early intervention: the
story of intersexed citizen Francis Benton (see Young, 1937, p.146), German physician
Claus Overzier, and adamant early-interventionists Dewhurst and Gordon (see Dewhurst
and Gordon, 1963, p.77). She stated that each confirmed the greater success had with sex
assignment postponed until later in life (or no intervention at all (Benton)), as opposed to
surgical intervention as an infant. In other words, where Kessler used evidence from
research from Money et al as data, Fausto-Sterling used, and endorsed, anecdotal
evidence, the work already conducted by researchers who came before.
As previously stated, Kessler’s backing regarded the limited number of studies
and reports that confirm adverse health effects caused by certain conditions related to
ambiguous genitalia. She stated, “[s]upportive evidence for Money and Ehrhardt’s theory
is based on only a handful of repeatedly cited cases…[and] [a]lmost all of the published
literature on intersexed infant case management has been written or cowritten by one
researcher, John Money…” (p.7). As further backing, she provided an example of a
physician who has extensive experience with intersex infant management, raised
differently in a nonindustrialized culture, where there is no harm documented for gender
development. In other words, her evidence was that there isn’t a sufficient diversity of
studies to merit the level of concern and interventions being advocated, and furthermore,
contradictory studies exist. Where Kessler used the medical research of Money et al as
data to back her claim, Fausto-Sterling used anecdotal evidence to do so. FaustoSterling’s underlying logic is that further research on the topic of intersex infant health
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isn’t necessary as there is ample evidence in the work of previous researchers like
Kessler.
SOCIAL MEANING
It is now obvious that one of the most significant arguments for genetics in
establishing biological sex are through its explanatory role for genital development and
configuration. However, as discussed in the literature review, Science is an interpretive
act. Intersex individuals are a primary example of such interpretation, especially when it
concerns post-birth decisions about sex assignment. In chapter four, “Should There Be
Only Two Sexes?” under the subheading “Right to Refuse,” Fausto-Sterling tackled this
issue of the medical management of intersexed infants. She offered a story of Helena
Harmon Smith, who, in the 1990s, was faced with the decision to alter her child born
with both an ovary and a testis. Doctors favored surgical alteration to create a boy,
however she refused on the grounds that her child was already “beautiful” and “had parts
[she] didn’t have” (p.92). The doctors ignored her decision and removed the child’s
gonads without her consent, which led Harmon-Smith to become an activist, founding the
“Hermaphrodite Education and Listening Post (HELP)” (p.92). She published a set of
instructions intended for when physicians encounter children like her own: no drastic
decision before the first year; families cannot be quarantined from support and
information; and, patients to be allowed the right to stay on the common ward (in lieu
isolation in the intensive care unit). Here, Fausto-Sterling cited the work of Kessler
(1998) which was used to mirror Harmon-Smith’s sentiment.
The original text is a lengthy script proposed by Kessler (1998) in Chapter six,
“Rethinking Genitals and Gender,” in the subsection, “The Future of Intersexed,” and I

27

believe it is important to relay it in its entirety. However, first, let me offer the context in
which it occurred. While discussing the current state of the medical management of
intersexed children, Kessler focused on the (re)interpretation of “the meaning of genitals”
(p.125). Her concern, in part, was about how to get parents comfortable with their
intersex children – how to present “larger-than-typical clitorises, absent vaginas, smallerthan-typical penises, off-center urinary openings, and irregularly shaped scrota and labia
…[as] acceptable markers of gender…” (p.128). Additionally, Obstetricians (OBs) were
said to have often mishandled the post-birth interaction with parents, so Kessler noted a
more sensitive approach that had been suggested by a psychiatrist in the field of
intersexuality. To paraphrase the model conversation, an OB would postpone answering
questions about the child’s determined “sex,” saying only “we will have to do some test”
(p.128) and would defer to the doctor once they arrived.
Although the suggested model for OBs was an improvement, Kessler wondered,
what about doctors? She said, “Imagine this script for a physician who is explaining the
birth of a girl whose clitoris has been affected by congenital adrenal hyperplasia:
“You have a beautiful baby girl. The size of her clitoris and her fused labia provided
us with a clue to an underlying medical problem that we might need to treat. Although
her clitoris is on the large size it is definitely a clitoris. Who knows what it’ll look like
as she grows! Some parents don’t have a realistic sense of what a baby’s genitals look
like. You probably haven’t seen that many, but I have. I’ll consult an endocrinologist,
but we won’t need a surgeon since there’s nothing we need to do about the clitoris.
The important thing about a clitoris is how it functions, now how it looks. She’s lucky.
Her sexual partners will find it easy to locate her clitoris. She doesn’t have a complete
vagina now and she can decide whether she wants one constructed when she’s older.
Surgical techniques will be more advanced then and her grown body will tolerate the
surgery better, if she chooses to have it” (p.128-129). (my emphasis).
The following selection is the citation in full as it appears in Fausto-Sterling’s book:
“Kessler suggests a new script to be used in announcing the birth of an XX child
affected by CAH: Congratulations. ‘You have a beautiful baby girl. The size of her
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clitoris and her fused labia provided us with a clue to an underlying medical problem
that we might need to treat. Although her clitoris is on the large size it is definitely a
clitoris…The important thing about a clitoris is how it functions, not how it looks.
She’s lucky. Her sexual partners will find it easy to locate her clitoris’” (p.92). (my
emphasis)
There are two key differences in Fausto-Sterling’s translation, outside of it merely
missing portions. First, notice that Fausto-Sterling said Kessler “suggested” the use of the
script. In the context where we find Kessler’s script, she is not suggesting its use, but
offering it to her readers to illustrate an alternative to the current practice, which would
expand the possibility for genital normalcy. Second, Kessler’s openness to surgery as
medical necessity is evident in the last section left off of Fausto-Sterling’s passage.
Kessler gave the impression that she may yet believe that gender is something worth
constructing, as long as it’s the patient’s decision. All of this would lead to, what Kessler
refers to as, a “treatment (r)evolution” (p.129). By leaving out the last two sentences,
Fausto-Sterling erased the qualifier that surgery may be an option and might be ok.
Considering the other instances where Fausto-Sterling has suggested a future where
gender identity is irrelevant, this elimination comes across as ideologically-fueled, and
manipulated in the service of her ultimate utopia.
In chapter three, “Gender and Genitals,” under the section titled, “The Surgical
Fix,” Fausto-Sterling tackled the issue of cultural interpretation. Rules for determining
“nature’s intention” for intersexed infants were, in part, developed by esteemed
embryologist and researcher Dr. Patricia Donahoe, the Professor of Surgery at Harvard
Medical School (HMS). First, a child with XX chromosomes (chromatin-positive) and
symmetrically placed gonads is defined as female pseudo-hermaphrodite. Second, a
chromatin-positive child with asymmetrical gonads (testis on one side and an ovary on
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the other) is defined as true hermaphrodite. Third, chromosome-negative (one X
chromosome) with symmetrical gonads would be defined as male pseudo-hermaphrodite.
Finally, chromosome-negative with asymmetrical gonads would be defined as mixedgonadal dysgenesis, “a catchall category containing individuals whose potentially male
gonads have some form of abnormal development” (p.57). In sum, the symmetry of
gonads and presence or absence of a second X chromosome serve as a speedy
determination method for physicians faced with intersexed infants, and this series of
stages is viewed as biologically-sourced.
However, Fausto-Sterling argued that the decision to “call a child a boy or a
girl…employs social definitions of the essential components of gender” (p.58) and these
“definitions…are primarily cultural, not biological” (p.58). For example, children born
XX intersex with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) – “a genetically inherited
malfunction of the enzymes that aid in making steroid hormones” (p.58) – are treated
differently in Europe and America than in Saudi Arabia. In Europe and America, XX
intersex children with masculinized genitalia would be raised as girls owing to their
potential for childbearing; however, in Saudi Arabia, the same children would be raised
as boys owing to the cultural preference for males. She continued, noting that cultural
preference for females was even more “tangled in social definitions of gender” (p.59).
That is, no matter what internal and external organs the intersexed infants appeared to
have, parents’ (cultural) preferences play a key role in assigning a child’s sex.
Fausto-Sterling added, decisions for early genital surgery also have psychological
goals. Intersex males and females are assigned their “true sex” via distinct criteria: males,
despite potential infertility, have rules that relate to the organ’s physical appearance (does
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it look normal to other boys) and its performance (can it do satisfactory work in
intercourse); females, on the other hand, are assigned their sex solely based on
reproductive capability. Fausto-Sterling said, “Doctors often follow Donahoe’s rule that
reproductive function be preserved…” (p.59). However, there are cases where this
reasoning was disregarded – penis structure was retained over reproductive capability.
Fausto-Sterling cited Kessler’s (1990) article where she reported “one case of a physician
choosing to reassign as male a potentially reproductive genetic female infant rather than
remove a well-formed penis” (p.59). That is, when, per the psychological rules of
“femaleness,” an intersex child would have been assigned as female, the appearance and
relatively intact function of a penis took precedence toward a male assignment.
Where Fausto-Sterling cited Kessler’s (1990) entire article, the most closely
related section to her purpose was “Social factors in decision making,” which discussed a
few examples of the social factors in sex assignment of intersexed infants. Kessler, citing
John Money, explained that the requirements for male assignment adhere strictly to look
and function. However, Money denoted an exception where even a perfectly formed
penis would not merit reassignment to male if it was not of the “same caliber as that of
same-aged males with small-average penises” (p.18). Additionally, citing a 1968 study by
Money, Kessler noted that an XX intersex child with masculinized genitalia would not be
recommended reassignment as female anticipating the parents’ reaction to “seeing ‘their
apparent son lose his penis’” (p.19). She went on to say that Money stated his opposition
to “neonatally amputating the penis of XX infants, since fetal masculinization of brain
structures would predispose them ‘almost invariably [to] develop behaviorally as
tomboys, even when reared as girls’” (p.19). She noted that, for Money and others,
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ultimately, the morally-conscious criteria for justifying surgery on intersexed infants is,
a) look, and b) function. So, the rules are unstable at best. Assigning an intersexed infant
as male should never happen unless the perfectly formed penis is of equal caliber to other
males, and female assignment and reproductivity shouldn’t be if, a) penis removal would
(potentially) shock the parents, or b) lead to tomboy behavioral development in a female
assigned child.
Kessler’s claim was that decisions to assign intersexed infants as male or female
are based in shared cultural values. Her evidence is that there are exceptions to every rule
of assignment, from physicians’ to parents’ desires for the child, based on reproductive
outcome, genital look and function, as well as behaviors linked to notions gender.
However, the way Fausto-Sterling cited Kessler was not an identical translation. FaustoSterling claimed that Kessler had cited an instance where a physician had preserved male
genitalia and assignment of an XX intersexed infant in lieu of female assignment despite
childbearing capability. However, the pages she cited merely stated were Kessler had
noted Money’s opposition to certain measures being taken in particular contexts, not that
he had refrained from the surgical procedures himself. Fausto-Sterling’s claim is similar
in that she argued sex determination as a social, not biological act; however, her evidence
(Kessler’s article) contained an inaccurate citation of the original text. Fausto-Sterling’s
data is also her qualifier, where female fertility usually predominates a physician’s
decision to assign sex, an exception was made to preserve the penis when it had familial
and psychological implications.
Fausto-Sterling continued the conversation about “fixing intersexuals,” and the
cultural interference into apparently genetic-based sex development and assignment, in
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the context of treatment protocols. In chapter three, “Gender and Genitals,” under the
subsection “The Psychological Fix,” she noted that physicians describe their surgical
decisions as being made in the best interest of the patient’s psychological health, and that
this exposed some ideologies about gender at work. She stated that in intersex
management, “…medical practitioners unintentionally reveal their anxieties that a full
disclosure of the facts about intersex bodies would threaten individuals’ – and by
extension society’s – adherence to a strict male-female model” (p.65). She was careful to
note that she was not advocating a conspiracy, rather that doctors are hindered by logical
binds owing to their deep-seated belief in binary sex/gender. Whether consciously or not,
Fausto-Sterling noted the repercussions of when physicians decide to preserve this
system at the expense of a patient’s long-term health (CLAIM). In AIS children, it is said
that early removal of the testes is done owing that they can be cancerous, but this doesn’t
occur at increased rates until post-puberty. Once the testes are removed, at puberty the
individual will have to take female hormones; however, natural feminization at puberty
would occur if the testes were preserved, as the androgen-insensitive body responds to
testicular estrogen. This, as Fausto-Sterling stated, reduces the risk of osteoporosis
brought on by artificially induced feminization, as well as the risks associated with
genital surgeries on infants. In this example, the patient’s health was put at risk in order
to preserve the notion of a two-sex system with accompanying genitals, which is framed
as psychologically beneficial for the parent, and the child as they mature.
She proceeded to a later portion of that same essay by Kessler (1990), titled
“Postinfancy case management,” for a particularly poignant example of such an instance.
Fausto-Sterling noted the story of an AIS patient who, at twenty-three years old, was told
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about a major ovarian removal surgery they had at birth (DATA). As a teen, they were
instructed to take estrogen pills owing to their removal, and were informed that in lieu of
having children, since their uterus wouldn’t develop, they could instead adopt children.
Fausto-Sterling wrote, “Another physician on the treatment team approved this
explanation. ‘He’s stating the truth, and if you don’t state the truth…then you’re in
trouble later.’” (p.66). She directly cited Kessler, saying “[g]iven that the girl never had a
uterus or ovaries, however, this was… ‘a strange version of ‘the truth’’” (p.66). In other
words, doctors removed the child’s testes at birth, which prevented the natural
feminization that would have occurred at puberty, then when that time came instructed
them to take estrogen pills because of a missing uterus, when a uterus was never present.
Instead of telling the patient about their removed testes, they preserved the system in a lie
and called it truth.
Kessler’s account of postinfancy case management was primarily concerned with
establishing the significant role of physicians in constructing gender, as parents “latch
onto the assignment as the solution to the problem…” (p.21). She remarked that although
the physicians she interviewed claimed the parents were equal participants, there were no
instances given where participation was evident before gender was assigned. It was only
afterward that parents were encouraged to “establish the credibility of that gender
publicly by, for example, giving a detailed medical explanation to a leader in their
community…who will explain the situation to curious casual acquaintances” (p.22). In
other words, the parents functioned as a vehicle for the physicians’ beliefs, fashioned in
the operating room and disseminated into the social world.
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Kessler’s claim was that physicians are responsible for the creation of binary sex
and gender in intersexed infants, and this role is potentially, and often, a risky one. The
risk is established in two ways: one, doctors not only decide what internal and external
sex organs will be kept or removed (recall the health hazards from the AIS story), but
they also counsel parents in how to manage the child post-surgery (creating and
sustaining gender norms), both on an individual level and in public; two, there is little
coherence across the postinfancy gender-management process” (p.23). This failing was
illustrated when she mentioned two other endocrinologists that she interviewed about the
female-assigned XY child with AIS and said each provided a different alternative way
they would have managed the interaction with the parents and, after puberty, the child.
One would have used a different term – ‘the gonads’ – and the other would have said
“that the uterus had never formed” (p.23), each substitute response a lie, as Kessler
argued.
Her data was the testimony of the endocrinologists whom she interviewed, their
stories corroborating all of these risks. Within her data was an explicit warrant, the
physical and psychological risks to patients by lying about medical procedures. This was
reason enough for physicians to be a focal point for changing the way we manage the
intersexed at all stages of life. For both authors, the overall argument remains the same,
that biological sex determination based on genetic development of genitals in children is
primarily a cultural act, and that physicians play the biggest role in establishing and
continuing notions of the “natural” body. The warrant is consistent between the two texts.
They both reasoned that reassignment surgery was used, and surgeons told half-truths and
outright lies to preserve “the greater good – keeping individual/concrete genders as clear
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and uncontaminated as the notions of female and male are in the abstract” (Kessler, 1990,
p.23), often at the expense of the patient’s immediate and/or long-term health.
In chapter four, “Should There Be Only Two Sexes?” under the subsection
“Revisiting the Five Sexes,” Fausto-Sterling outlined the physical and psychological
scarring that patients often experience when surgically altered, as well as both outcomes
of those who are not. She argued that those who reasoned for upholding the status quo of
intersexed management offered weak cases at best, citing eighteen publications in
medical journals that highlighted the results of these surgical cases. She continued,
explaining the “fork in the road” for the future of intersex management: “To the right we
can walk toward reaffirmation of the naturalness of the number 2 [the binary] and
continue to develop new medical technology, including gene ‘therapy’ and new prenatal
interventions to ensure the birth of only two sexes. To the left, we can hike up the hill of
natural and cultural variability” (p.101). In other words, we can either continue along the
same path we’ve been on or we can entertain a new perspective. The goal is the total
elimination of gender identity as a consequential aspect of personhood.
Fausto-Sterling took a hopeful stance, calling for the revolutionary acceptance of
intersexed bodies for the benefit of all persons. She stated,
Imagine a future in which our knowledge of the body has led to resistance against
medical surveillance, in which medical science has been placed at the service of
gender variability, and gender have multiplied beyond currently fathomable limits.
Suzanne Kessler suggests that ‘gender variability can…be seen…in a new way – as an
expansion of what is meant by male and female.’ (p.101) (CLAIM).
Fausto-Sterling characterized a possible future where “concepts of masculinity and
femininity might overlap so completely as to render the very notion of gender difference
irrelevant” (p.101). She suggested that permissible gender roles are changing and the
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boundaries between sex and gender are deteriorating, as evidenced by stay-at-home dads,
female fighter pilots, both feminine lesbians and muscular and macho gays, and femaleto-male/male-to-female trans individuals (DATA). The next step of intersexed inclusion,
she argued, is a critical phase of getting to place where gender identity becomes
unnecessary and/or inconsequential.
Kessler’s version of this particular conversation, however, is notably different
from how it appeared in Fausto-Sterling’s book. The context in which she spoke was a
proposition of two new ways physicians might talk about intersexuality in order to
revolutionize thinking about gender. As new rhetoric is required each time a surgery is
performed (penis, vagina, scrotum, labia, etc.), new rhetoric was also a starting point for
moving forward (CLAIM). One, she stated that it could be confronted directly, where
physicians and support groups work toward a similar goal – the denormalization of the
“condition” of intersex and the acknowledgment of gender prejudices, exploring
frequently unspoken concerns. Kessler believed that parents were ready to hear new
explanations, new philosophies, about this issue, and that medical journals were silent on
‘the wide variety of (often positive) responses [from parents] to what one might see as a
death sentence’” (p.130). In other words, reported outcomes were biased regarding
parental responses to having intersexed children, and it favored the traumatic and tragic
stories over the numerous affirming ones (DATA).
Two, Kessler also suggested that the issue could be dealt with indirectly. She
noted that “physicians… shelter[ed] parents from intersexuality while believing in it
themselves” (p.130) and that this is how the situation became, and continues to be,
normalized. Instead, she proposed that intersexuality be bracketed from thought, leaving
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physicians with only the physical genitals, which “might not even be noteworthy beyond
their initial signal of an underlying medical condition” (p.130). This discursive element
of intersexuality is key, she noted, because physicians often side step certain words
owing to their emotional implication (BACKING). For example, as a rule, terms like
hermaphrodite or intersex are never used by physicians in conversations with parents.
With that in mind, she recommended that, instead of saying someone’s daughter had a
masculinized clitoris or that she had male chromosomes, physicians used phrases like
“larger than most” or “having XY chromosomes,” because “[c]osmetic issues are issues
that lay persons can reasonably have an opinion about and disagree with surgeons about,
but gender issues are not, or at least not yet” (p.131). In sum, physicians can either/both
adopt a new way of discussing intersexed bodies with parents, and/or eliminate the
identity of intersexed from decision-making processes when faced with atypical genitalia.
It is here where we find the quote used in Fausto-Sterling’s book. Kessler stated,
“Genital variability can continue to be seen as a condition to be remedied or in a new
way – as an expansion of what is meant by female and male” (p.131) (my emphasis). She
continued, “Whether the meaning one imparts to genital variability reifies gender or
trivializes it has important implications for gender and intersex management. We need to
consider different possibilities about how to manage intersexuality, including the
possibility of not managing it at all” (p.131). The next sentence Kessler added was
critical to the argument. She noted, “The future of intersex is in some sense the future of
gender” (p.131). This quote, in the way it appears in Kessler’s work, had a different tone
and overall perspective about the issue at hand.
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Notice one of the biggest differences is that Kessler used the term “genital” and
not “gender” as the type of variability. The characteristic in question for Kessler is the
use of genitals to determine intersexed identity. Additionally, she used gender and
intersexed separately, suggesting that “in some sense” one is the future of the other. That
is a key difference, and added qualifier, to the overall argument being made. As FaustoSterling changed the topic to “gender” variability she altered the claim. Additionally,
where Kessler included that intersex could “continue to be seen as a condition to be
remedied” she structured a conditional proposition, changing the frame of the statement
from one of optimism, as in Fausto-Sterling’s version, to one that conveyed a challenge
to the medical community.
The management of intersexed humans could be achieved by either A or B.
Kessler is not, as Fausto-Sterling was, conveying a hopefulness about dissolving gender
identity, she constructed a means to separate the connection of genitals to gender. Near
the conclusion, Kessler argued that “[b]y subverting genital primacy, gender will be
removed from the biological body and placed in the social-interactional one. Even if there
are…two genders…how you ‘do’ [them]…would be open to interpretation” (p.132). In
other words, not only does Fausto-Sterling’s interpretation combine two categories
discussed separately in Kessler’s work (genitals and gender), it expanded the argument to
a place Kessler did not go - the management of the intersexed from an optimism for
gender-irrelevance.
Second, the context of the authors’ argument is different. Kessler was concerned
with the communication between physicians and parents, stating “…parents of intersexed
infants have the legal responsibility, but they take their cues from the medical
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professionals, whose status permits them to define the ‘real’ view of intersexuality,
relegating other views, like the political intersexuals’, to a fringe perspective” (p.131).
She aimed to illustrate the elements required for a revolution in thinking and talking
about gender, and placed responsibility in the hands of two players. Fausto-Sterling was
expanding on Kessler’s work to propose the necessary elements for her “utopia,” where
intersexed identities are not of consequence, because “[m]edical intervention aimed at
synchronizing body image and gender identity would only rarely occur before the age of
reason” (p.101).
At the end of Fausto-Sterling’s third chapter, in the section titled, “Wrap-Up:
Reading Nature Is a Sociocultural Act,” she started by stating that the medical approaches
to talking about and managing intersexed bodies provides a literal example of the “social
construction” of physical, or material, bodies. As what has been discussed throughout this
section of the analysis, Fausto-Sterling has claimed that no matter what, “[a]ll choices,
whether to treat with chemicals, perform surgeries, or let genitally mixed bodies alone,”
(p.75) are choices based on cultural preferences, and are not inherently biological
decisions (CLAIM). This context served as the backdrop for her use of poststructuralist
theorist, Judith Butler’s, Bodies That Matter (1993). Of all the arguments concerning
genetics-based sex development and assignment sustained in Sexing the Body, this is by
far the most complex regarding structure and application. Fausto-Sterling stated, “The
feminist philosopher Judith Butler suggests that ‘bodies…only live within the productive
constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas’” (p.75) (DATA). For
example, as Fausto-Sterling related, the regulations for being a (culturally intelligible)
male and female are strict, primarily defined by genital appearance (“No oversized clits
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or under-sized penises allowed” (p.75-76)) and behavior (“No masculine women or
effeminate men need apply” (p.76)).
Butler’s (1993) original quote is situated within a complex conversation, one
which grapples with the constitutive function of necessary, and preceding, (gendered)
constructions of the body – those based on primary and indisputable experience. That is,
if I may oversimplify, she questioned whether there is an “I” or “we” without certain
constructions that tell us who “we” are, and these constructions are always already
representations constrained by gender. To say it yet another way, the “facts” of our
physicality can be thought of as separate, but they are equally irrefutable as the necessary
affirmation of that physicality, or, how we understand and interpret the physical form and
the meaning we give it. In this context, Judith Butler’s full passage reads as follows:
Thinking the body as constructed demands a rethinking of the meaning of constructed
itself. And if certain constructions appear constitutive, that is, have this character of
being that “without which” we could not think at all, we might suggest that bodies
only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly
gendered regulatory schemas (p.xi).
So, where Butler can be said to be remarking on the psychological or cognitive act of
“constructing” intelligible bodies – those that can be, as in this example, understood as
either male or female and treated accordingly – Fausto-Sterling has used the notion of
“construction” in a literal sense to help explain the social, or cognitive, role in
constructing physical bodies.
At the most local level, intersexed bodies are surgically sculpted based on a model
of preexisting gender schemas (i.e., the physicians’ deep-seated beliefs) and then
managed within those same gendered schemas (i.e. – the parents’ and community’s
participation). Fausto-Sterling’s claim can be seen as a literal representation, or perhaps
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extension, of Butler’s abstract theory. This is a clever, concrete application of a rather
abstract theory, which critics often cite as immaterial for its seemingly lacking fitness for
practical use. The two authors operate the theory in arguably different contexts, one in the
intellectual realm the other in the real-world, but I believe the guiding principle, and
claim, remains constant. Our realities, our perceptions, our knowledges are socially
constructed, normalized through repetition until they acquire a “naturalized” sense of
being. Biological sex and notions of gender are both socially constructed and deemed
“natural.”
The authors data are similar, even though distant in context. Butler used the
intellectual “constructions,” without which we could not function, as evidence of the
social construction of our reality, and Fausto-Sterling used intersexed bodies that lay
outside the culturally intelligible realm of acceptable bodies, ones we manage in order to
fit a binary we deem solely appropriate. Butler’s use of abstract evidence makes sense
owing that her work is not, per se, rooted in the physical, but more the constitutive force
of interpretations of the physical. Fausto-Sterling, having used most of her book to argue
for the role the intersexed play in disrupting biological determinism and gender norms,
logically used material bodies as evidence for social determinism’s primary role in sex
and gender assignment.
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
In the above analysis, I moved through Anne Fausto-Sterling’s (2000) critique of
two categories used to secure the notion of genetics-based biological sex development
and assignment, that of phenotype and social meaning. Phenotype is the physical
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expression of a combination of interacting chromosomes and hormones, usually studied
through internal and external sex organs. Social meaning denotes the cultural
interpretation of the physical form of bodies, or materiality. Each section contained two
to five unique scenarios, or contexts, wherein the arguments were reinterpreted by
Fausto-Sterling. In each scenario, the author’s argument was situated within a larger
discussion about intersexed bodies and various aspects of their existence (i.e. – the
doctor’s method of deciding what sex to assign through surgery and hormone therapy, the
parents’ role in following the prescribed gender management, the repercussions of certain
early surgeries on intersexed infants, etc,). In the following section, I will discuss the
results of the argument analysis in each category and subsection in conversation with my
three research questions: first, how does Fausto-Sterling translate technical arguments
questioning biological sex for a popular audience? Second, how do these translations
vary from their technical origins? Finally, what rhetorical and/or ideological work is
accomplished by these translations? At the close of the discussion, I consider the
limitations of my study and propose a future research trajectory.
In the first section, “Phenotype,” I start with a selection by Alice Dreger where
she discussed the history of categorization for hermaphrodites in her book,
Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (1998). Fausto-Sterling and Dreger
shared the claim that scientific methods were classifying “true” hermaphrodites out of
existence. Fausto-Sterling, however, had a markedly different feeling about the evolution
of the categories than did Dreger. They both used the three researchers’ work as data, but
where Dreger regarded two of the three players in this evolution with seeming
indifference, Fausto-Sterling equated all three equally. She implicated each with
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responsibility for limiting classification of hermaphrodites to a dichotomy of gonads and
starting the medical phasing out of the existence of “true” hermaphrodites.
Although the resulting aspect of the data differs, Fausto-Sterling’s use of Dreger’s
work fits with the understanding of advancing philosophies for popular audiences in
BLSEs. The aim was to demonstrate, using Dreger as anecdotal evidence, that the use of
gonads to determine biological sex was unstable and changeable, and therefore
inadequate to call natural in any sense. However, she also advances a different viewpoint
about the characterization of intersexed bodies by all three scientists through her position
on their culpability for the harsh treatment of the intersex in medicine and society – an
ideological move that separates her from Dreger in an important way. The larger claim is
not altered in its translation, but the context into which it was transplanted differs
critically considering her other contentions throughout the book.
The second argument regarding phenotype was concerned with the scientific
dogma which would have us believe that if intersexed infants are not operated on they are
destined to live awful lives in constant misery. Fausto-Sterling, again, used anecdotal
evidence, but this time cited Suzanne Kessler (1990). Kessler’s claim was that, aside
from the occasional health risk associated with certain conditions of intersex, having
ambiguous genitalia was not life-threatening. She cited the research published by John
Money, the sole researcher publishing on this matter, to warrant that insufficient evidence
did not a diagnosis make. Fausto-Sterling’s use of Kessler’s work as data could be argued
as an illustration of her views concerning research saturation. That is, she did not feel
that more research was needed to prove the case against scientific dogma, but believed
ample enough critique existed that it should be considered as sound and definitive. Again,

44

the use of anecdote as evidence served to support her argument against phenotype-based
sex assignment, and the argument remained consistent between the original author and
her interpretation. This is in line with the assertion that BLSEs uphold scholarly rigor and
standards for evidence while remaining accessible to lay audiences
In the second section titled, “Social Meaning,” I began by discussing FaustoSterling’s argument that much of the notions we hold about gender stem from the way
that physicians manage their engagements with parents of intersexed children. She cited a
script offered by Kessler (1998) in which more sensitive language was used to relay the
news to parents about their ambiguous children. There were key differences between
Kessler’s and Fausto-Sterling’s version of the script. Fausto-Sterling stated that Kessler
“suggested” its use and left out a large section of the full passage from her translation.
Kessler, while presenting an alternative, said to “imagine” the script being used, which
gives it a much different feel and context.
It was not prescribed as a cure for intersex-phobia of parents but used to illustrate
other potential methods of approaching the issue to start changing their perceptions. The
omitted section with the most significance came at the end where Kessler mentioned
future surgery as an option if the child desired it later in life, while the context of FaustoSterling’s use would not allow for such a suggestion. This illuminates Fausto-Sterling’s
ideological standpoint about future management paths for intersexed infants and
advances her philosophy away from the pioneer in the field. Staying with the features of
BLSE’s and the fostered space for theorizing alternatives to prior research, FaustoSterling uses Kessler as a jumping-off point to develop her ideas and argue for alternative
measures.
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Kessler’s work challenged Fausto-Sterling in a pivotal way elsewhere in the book,
but it did not fall into the purview of this analysis. Importantly, she ended up altering her
position on that major issue in response – namely the tongue-in-cheek use of the terms
hermaphrodite, mermaphrodite, and fermaphrodite (Fausto-Sterling, 1993) for varying
intersexed body types. Therefore, I do not believe that Fausto-Sterling disagrees so much
with Kessler that her use of the research could be considered cherry-picking on this
particular subject. She yet managed to translate Kessler’s work, despite its minor
disagreements with her own, so that the overall message was preserved. The issues
surrounding talking about hermaphrodites, or intersexed persons, using terminology
which pre-genders them remained consistent in perspective in translation.
The second subsection covered Fausto-Sterling’s use of Kessler’s (1990) work
regarding the social factors that affect physicians when deciding an intersexed infant’s
sex. Kessler noted that John Money, in his research, in one case had advised against
reassigning a child female, despite having masculinized genitalia, because the cognitive
link to genitalia would cause the reassigned girl to become a tomboy – an obviously
terrible outcome in his expert opinion. Fausto-Sterling used this as anecdotal evidence
(and qualifier) that while most often female fertility is preserved, if certain sociallyundesirable traits would result, then exceptions are made. However, the evidence does
not seem to be accurate.
Kessler did not claim that Money had opted against doing a surgery himself
(preserving male genitalia in an XX child), but that Money merely would not recommend
it. I do not know if this was a misreading of Kessler’s work, as each individual interprets
differently; however, it does, in this instance, weaken her argument since her data seems
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to be false. I do not doubt that instances that prove her point have been published in other
articles unrelated to John Money (I believe Fausto-Sterling even cited them earlier), but it
is odd to use this example as proof when there may have been others more well-suited.
The next subsection was an analysis of an instance where Fausto-Sterling argued
about the adverse health effects of early surgical intervention for intersexed infants.
Taking from a later section of the same essay by Kessler (1990), she used testimonial
evidence from Kessler as data. Kessler’s interviews of endocrinologists and obstetricians
produced an account of an AIS child who was lied to about a major surgery at infancy.
The postinfancy management of the intersexed is claimed to be mishandled and
inconsistent writ large, by Kessler, and Fausto-Sterling concurred. Again, the use of
anecdotal data might suggest that Fausto-Sterling believed in the authority of Kessler’s
thorough research, and that she did not feel the need for more to be done for the sake of
surplus. The warrant that patient health is the expense of retaining the status quo (clear
social delineations of gender) is clear in both author’s texts, so the translation holds its
original structure.
The penultimate section revealed the most about Fausto-Sterling’s ideological
aims for her research and writing. She used Kessler’s discussion of genital variability to
expand her argument for optimistic engagement with a genderless future. Kessler
suggested that different ways of talking about genital variability, for physicians
particularly, might open up other possibilities for interpreting “doing” intersex. That is
not the utopian idealism conveyed by Fausto-Sterling in her use of the passage. Sexing
the Body approaches the future of biological sex from a different intellectual space, where
the radical ideas of Kessler were pushed even further to imagine science-fiction as reality.
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Where authors like Octavia Butler and Martine Rothblatt have stretched the imagination
regarding similar topics, Fausto-Sterling appeared to be attempting a similar boundarybreaking, using the BLSE as a tool for advancing current gender theory. Kessler’s
approach was very practical, and it did well to provide a path for initiating change at its
roots but considering the popular audience she intended to be addressing, Fausto-Sterling
took up her instruction and pushed the theoretical boundaries to a more radical position.
Lastly, and arguably the most unique application of a citation, Fausto-Sterling
looked to Judith Butler and her work Bodies that Matter (1993) to guide her argument
about the social nature of sex assignment. Butler labored in the abstract realm of
constitutive forces like social construction, careful to highlight that the term
“construction” needed rethinking entirely. She meant that physical bodies do in fact exist,
but that their affirmation, or cultural interpretation, is a construction. Fausto-Sterling
concretized the abstract theory of social determinism, using intersexed bodies as the
literal example of social constructions of sex. Although the data cited (Butler) was
intended to challenge the notion that there are no social elements to observing a physical
body, Fausto-Sterling took it up in a new way that challenged critics of poststructural
thinking for its lack of practicality. Fausto-Sterling demonstrated that understanding the
socially determined foundations of sex was paramount for challenging not only biological
determinism, but science as a whole. This was an alteration, in a sense, of the original
message, but for the argument and audience of the book, her ideological position is
spotlighted.
In sum, Fausto-Sterling’s translation of scientific/academic writing for a popular
audience aligned with the results of Fahnestock’s (1986, 2004) studies. The complex
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terminology was altered for lay audiences, contexts were altered to advance the author’s
research agenda, and elements of the arguments were changed – some of the original
hedges were removed, selections of writing were omitted, and alternative warrants were
used to connect the data to the claim). However, the core of the arguments were
preserved in integrity, providing a non-expert audience with reliable scientific
information. Further, she illustrated the significance of the findings to the audience
without overexaggerating its certainty. For instance, when discussing the need to change
the way we understand sex and gender she noted that there is no assured correlation
between altering scientific/popular discourse and social change. Lastly, her decision to
retain and alter various aspects of the original arguments illuminates the ways her beliefs
vary from those of the other authors. For example, through her discussion of
hermaphrodites she illustrates her position that no classification system should have been
created and that the desire to codify ambiguous bodies exemplifies the cultural belief in,
and desire to maintain, a dichotomous biological sex.
The message of the book is one of extreme importance in our current cultural and
political climate. Considering the moves being taken to restrict the rights of the LBGT
community and women by the Trump administration, these claims are vital for
reimagining the notions currently embraced about foundational differences between men
and women. This, at minimum, is evidence enough that the work done in this book is
special, worthy of study, and needs to be explored further. If we broaden the scope and
think about the influence scientific popularizations have on lay audience, we can see the
value of radical research like this for the masses. Having such weighted impact on public
opinion, science and its accommodations may serve to begin the journey towards
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important policy changes if used in conjunction with public education and voter
encouragement. I, like Fausto-Sterling, may be measured as an idealist for believing that
books can influence politics. However, current data on the successful persuasive
influence of popularizations and research articles on expert and lay audiences suggests
the potential for a similar effect from discourses successfully addressing a duel audience.
LIMITATIONS
This study had its limitations, especially owing to the strict parameters enacted in
service of my arguments and research questions. First, since I was only concerned with
the portion of the essay which was intended for a general audience, there were arguments
that were not included, each regarding other aspects of genetics-based sex development
and assignment. Second, and related to the third, owing that this is a solo work of its kind
– academically rigorous, radical in its position on biological sex, and accessible to the
public – the sample size is that of one. The analysis should be taken up with different
parameters, focused outside of radical theories on sex (something broached by Varghese
and Abraham, 2004). In order to make more general claims about the pedagogical utility
and paradigmatic of genre of the book for scientific writing on sex (or any subject for that
matter, to increase public and scholarly engagement) would require that the subject and
style of this book be duplicated in large numbers by other scholars.
FUTURE RESEARCH
If this research were continued, I would remove the parameter which limited me
to analyzing only the front-half of the essay. I believe that the author has produced a
model for radical feminist writing about biological sex, and I think that there is much to
be learned, and strides to be made, by incorporating all of the various arguments she
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makes, injecting them deeper into the debate within academic, scientific, and public
circles. Also, it would be advantageous to open up the analysis to all the arguments made
regarding sex and its assignment, not just ones related to genetics. My interest narrowed
my search, but it would be interesting to see how Fausto-Sterling translated, for example,
arguments concerning neuroscience or animal biology from a feminist perspective.
Additionally, I think it would be valuable to extend this research outside of
debates surrounding genetics, sex development, and gender. This model may be just as
applicable in other disciplines and specialties. I see real value in the potential to, for
example, bridge the class gap between the educated and those not as fortunate. By
providing a series of BLSEs to enlighten a public on myriad topics, ones that they would
not otherwise be exposed to outside of higher education, we may open up an alternative
path for citizens to seek out and learn new information. Lastly, I would like to see what
even more radical versions of this text would look like. In psychology, it is said that
change comes from within, and that principle can be applied to critical social change as
well. Critical work has an ethical obligation to not remain within the halls of science
and/or academia but find its way into the hands of the masses.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this study, I analyzed the arguments used by Anne Fausto-Sterling, in her book
Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (2000) to critique
notions of genetics-based sex development and assignment. My study was guided by
three research questions. First, how does Fausto-Sterling translate technical arguments
questioning biological sex for a popular audience? This engaged prior research on
popularization studies and the strategies identified for translating scientific information
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for lay audiences. Second, how do these translations vary from their technical origins?
That is, after ascertaining the author’s claims (that argument or proposition), data
(evidence or proof), and warrants (the explicit or implicit reasoning that connects claims
and data), were there differences in arrangement structure or context between FaustoSterling’s use of the source material and the source material itself. Finally, what
rhetorical and/or ideological work is accomplished by these translations?.
Strictly speaking, when an author makes a choice to alter content, it reveals
something about their values and beliefs. To use a practical, yet admittedly inane,
example, if, in the wake of a natural disaster, one national headline read, “Poor People
Unprepared for Life Event,” and another read “Community Rocked by Disaster,” we
could deduce that the former held an unfavorable, even biased, view of the community
affected by the event. Similarly, if Fausto-Sterling altered the organization, context, or
content of the primary author’s work, it would reveal something about her position
regarding the material cited.
Once I had located all instances where genetics-based biological sex development and
assignment were discussed, I identified two related categories about which they were
made: first, that of phenotype (the physical expression of the combination of
chromosomes and hormones on the body); and second, social meaning (the cultural
interpretation of a phenotype). My findings, as confirmed in the discussion, demonstrated
when and how alterations were made to aspects of the cited material. One major thematic
difference was that Fausto-Sterling did not always agree with all of the viewpoints of the
author she cited, but still incorporated their work in a way that was consistent with the
original claim. For example, where Dreger’s work on hermaphroditism was cited, Fausto-
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Sterling felt strongly against all three physicians who helped create the dichotomous
categories in which to assign them. Both authors shared the physicians’ work as data,
however Dreger only noted the most recent physician, Klebs, as culpable in the scientific
erasure of “true” hermaphrodites.
Another major finding was that Fausto-Sterling provided a practical application of the
poststructuralist theory of social determinism. Critics of poststructuralist feminism often
cite that it is useful in abstract but provides no real-world solutions to social problems. In
Fausto-Sterling’s use of Butler (1993), she illustrated that this abstract theory can be
literally interpreted through the physical bodies of the intersexed. She demonstrated that
the constitutive force of social construction defended in theory relates to how intersexed
bodies live as abject, or uninterpretable, in a social world where binary boundaries rule
what is counted as real. In other words, if nothing more, Fausto-Sterling has provided a
tremendous counterargument to those who would disqualify social determinism as folly.
In addition, Fausto-Sterling displayed her ability to expound upon previous
scholarship, concurrent with the landscape of BLSEs, taking what is grounded in the
radical and pushing it to further extremes of the imagination. For example, Kessler
(1998) proposed effective discourse surrounding genital variability as the beginning of
the acceptance of more varied ways of “doing” gender. The possibilities Kessler saw
inspired Fausto-Sterling to imagine her own “utopia” (her term), where eventually gender
was irrelevant. She altered the exact structure of Kessler’s argument, but deduced
something that maybe Kessler didn’t see herself. I believe this is a valuable trait that
Fausto-Sterling possesses, but it also illustrated the practical utility of BLSEs for
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advancing theory. Sexing the Body , in particular, is a useful model for translating sexrelated academic/genetic-science information to lay audiences.
In line with feminist literature concerned with avenues for social change, my study
provides beneficial material to guide writing towards the style found in Fausto-Sterling’s
radical BLSE. With its effective balance between scholarly rigor and accessibility, and
potential for disseminating radical philosophy to lay audiences, BSLEs are an effective
genre for delivering highly technical, or jargon-laden, writing in a way that is
comprehendible to non-expert audience. Also, considering the influential power of
scientific information for the masses, BLSEs possess an ethical dimension, properly
translating information that can have tremendously negative consequences through
misunderstandings.
Academics, and particularly communication scholars, value the ability to interrogate
the institutions that maintain orders of hierarchy, principally those that serve to oppress or
disenfranchise certain groups, and Fausto-Sterling (as Kessler before her) has illustrated
that the social construction of biological sex lives within one of those institutions, that of
Science. However, scholarly work often remains within the seminar rooms and journal
publications that are restricted to the common person. Now that Fausto-Sterling has taken
that information and recalibrated it for general consumption, the number of people who
can be included in the debate has the potential to multiply, which I believe should be a
priority.
As stated before, I do not believe that this is fantasy or idealism. Sexing the Body has
already proven to be a foundational inspiration for gender courses across the country, as
well as for popular publications to take a more progressive position in their writing about
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issues related to sex and gender. One of the top three newspapers in the country, The
New York Times, published an article where the author stated that she uses FaustoSterling’s work as a week-one introduction for anthropology and gender studies
undergraduates, and then continued to discuss the counterpoints Sexing the Body makes
about traditional notions of sex development. That and other popular publications show
what a major impact her work has had on both academic and public discourse.
The science on this topic has made its way into mainstream formats and with each
new revelation indicates that our understanding and measure of biological sex
development and its subsequent assignment are becoming increasingly outdated. From
genitalia, to hormones, to chromosomes, to genes, the characteristics used to define the
category of male and female sex(-at-birth) overlap more than they neatly align. So, what,
right? Who cares whether or not someone is or isn’t a certain sex? Well, when
considering recent events, it is apparent that many people do. North Carolina’s attempt at
a “Bathroom Bill”, and Trump’s religious freedom order and ban on transgender military
service, are examples of merely the most recent effects of a historic public
misunderstanding, and oversimplification, of a complex, overlapping sex/gender
category. As science is still considered the most powerful authority for explaining “life”
(with exception of the pockets of anti-intellectualism, like those of the current Trump
administration), this is a unique moment. I believe that the information available to us
now, established by Fausto-Sterling in form and content, could shape a powerful
movement for issues relating to political and social justice.
This study contributes to current research on the rhetoric of science, especially the
study of accommodations and popularizations of scientific texts. Fahnestock (1986) noted
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that the translation of scientific information is a moral problem owing to the severe
repercussions it can have owing to its powerful influence on the audience. At the end of
her 1986 essay, she suggests that new teaching methods be adopted for students writing
in STEM owing to the potential for miscommunication and the ramifications of
misunderstanding of scientific findings. She used an example of two John Hopkins
psychologists who, in 1980, reported in Science on the results of a study that tested for
mathematic aptitude between boys and girls.
Noting the rapid uptake in popular press, Fahnestock said that the translation altered
the results, eliminating all qualifiers and hedges in the findings, which suggested that
boys were in fact better, and that the “difference [was] caused by inherent aptitude”
(p.286). My study has demonstrated that Fausto-Sterling’s poignant critiques of scientific
discourses and practices, gender and Science, and the ideologies of science preserves the
technical and theoretical specificity and accuracy of the original formulations. This
positions her text as a pedagogical tool for Fahnestock’s desired novel teaching practices.
Both Myths of Gender and Sexing the Body are currently utilized as foundational
educational aids in anthropology and gender studies classes across the country, but this
study provides evidence to suggest a third application as a model for technical writing in
the sciences.
To close, we are in the midst of a rare moment. There is a growing public interest
in genomics and its explanatory potential for questions ranging from genetic diseases to
personal ancestry and beyond. The interest has leaked over into popular science
magazines, which have picked up various aspects of genetic science debates like
transgender identity, apparent mixed-sex-determinations, and the like. Up to this point,
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there hasn’t been much in the way of quality, critical engagement with the subject of
genetics/genomics which could be considered effectively accurate and accessible to the
public. It is here where we may find a service to be taken from a blending of scientific
and academic writing potentially fostered in the hybrid genre of book-length scholarly
essays. As we seek out new avenues for social change by providing rigorously critiqued,
highly accessible, valuable information to a ready public, we may just find the BLSE to
be an extremely valuable piece of that puzzle.
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